We examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years 2000 to 2010, with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession. First, we merge Execucomp executive compensation records with IRS tax records. We compare incomes from our Execucomp sample to top incomes reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) . We disaggregate executive income trends by industry, showing which industries are driving the divergence in top executive incomes. We compare our results to fi ndings from Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010) , who examine trends in top incomes for broad occupation and industry categories for years prior to the Great Recession. We also decompose these income trends by income source to see which components are driving the observed changes. We fi nd that stock options are by far the most volatile component of executive pay. Options are the key driver of both short-term swings and longer-term trends in top executive pay. However, stock awards are also a large and growing component. We fi nd much greater variation in income across years than across industries. Executive incomes are most volatile at the very top of income distribution. In general, trends for top executives in fi nance and non-fi nance industries are quite similar; however; for those above the 99.9 th percentile of the income distribution, the decline in income from 2006 to 2009 was much more pronounced for executives in fi nance.
recent fi nancial crisis has heightened concerns that the incentives of executives are misaligned with the interests of shareholders, or at least the interests of society at large. Additionally, there is a perception that while the top of the distribution has enjoyed tremendous income gains, incomes at the median (and more generally for the bulk of Americans) have stagnated. 1 Incomes of high-level executives are frequently used as examples of rising inequality. In attempts to better align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, executives are often rewarded (or punished) based on the performance of the fi rm; however, to a great extent, fi rm performance is driven by forces outside any individual's control. 2 A growing perception is that executive pay is often excessive, not merit-based, and that incentives for managers and shareholders are not properly aligned. Some argue that the often super-high incomes of executives are to a large extent the product of malfeasance or gaming of the system (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009 ). Others argue that executive incomes at large fi rms (particularly fi nancial institutions) are artifi cially high due to implicit government guarantees that generally protect bondholders against losses and in so doing, lower borrowing costs and encourage excessive risk taking (Stern and Feldman, 2004) .
Top executives are highly concentrated within the very top of the income distribution. However, they likely remain a small minority even among the very top income groups. Based on Execucomp data, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) report that Execucomp executives comprise roughly 3 percent of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution. Including imputations for executives in non-Execucomp fi rms only modestly raises these estimates. 3 Previous studies have used executive compensation data (usually required as part of SEC fi lings) to examine trends in executive or CEO compensation (Eissa and Giertz, 2006; Goolsbee, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 2000; Frydman and Saks, 2010) . Other studies have used tax data to examine top incomes, but these studies usually cannot separately identify executives from others with high incomes. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) is an exception in that they impute occupations for tax fi lers, including executives. However, no study to our knowledge has merged executive compensation data directly with U.S. tax returns.
In this paper, we examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years 2000 to 2010, with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession.
II. CONSTRUCTING A DATASET: MATCHING EXECUTIVES TO TAX RETURNS
We link individual tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service's Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW) with Execucomp compensation records for CEOs plus the next four highest paid executives (based on salary and bonus income). 5 By exactly match-ing executives to their tax returns, we are able to examine the tax information for this important and primarily very high-income group. Conversely, we are able to examine income sources for these tax fi lers that are not reported to the IRS.
The Execucomp data contain information on 38,500 unique executives spanning the years 1992 to 2010. These data are compiled by Standard and Poor's from proxy statements and 10-K forms (fi led with the Securities and Exchange Commission) and are part of S&P's Compustat database. Included in the dataset are corporations in the Standard and Poor's S&P 1500 Index (i.e., corporations in the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P Small Cap 600). The data are primarily a subset of U.S. taxpayers near the very top of the income distribution. The compensation information includes salaries, option awards, option values, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), bonuses, stock grants, and many other forms of taxable and non-taxable income. The company information includes total assets, market capitalization, earnings, total employment, and other fi nancial information.
Annual Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Files (PUFs) have been the most important source for tracking trends in top incomes for the United States. However, the PUFs remove information that could be used to identify individual taxpayers (or to link taxpayers across years). A panel of tax returns was made public for years 1979 to 1990, but the sample sizes are too small to effectively examine trends at the very top of the income distribution. In terms of confi dential tax data, the SOI maintains a stratifi ed random sample of tax returns that heavily oversample top incomes. While this dataset includes tax returns for executives at the very top of the income distribution, it does not sample many with moderately high (as opposed to very high) income.
The CDW data, on the other hand, include tax returns for the universe of U.S. tax fi lers for the years 1996 to 2011 and are only available to a handful of groups within the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Joint Committee on Taxation. Major sources of income (e.g., taxable income, deductions, credits), commonly used forms (e.g., Form 1040, Form W-2, and various schedules), and other information are available for every return.
Even with the universe of tax returns, matching tax information to executives is complex. The Execucomp does not include unique Individual Taxpayer Identifi cation Numbers (ITINs), which would make the match straightforward, 6 and no single shared and unique identifi er is included in both datasets. However, by matching based on an array of variables available in both datasets, we can produce exact matches for most executives. Because W-2 forms (submitted by employers) are incorporated into the CDW beginning in 2000, we have several pieces of identifying information in both datasets. 7 These include the company EIN and the last name, fi rst name, and middle initial of the individual. Year of birth and sex from the Social Security Administration's Data Master File (DM-1) are also used. After matching TINs to the Execucomp, we retrieve tax information from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Databank and Form 1040 from the CDW.
For the years 2000 to 2010, our core sample contains 214,500 tax observations, 120,500 Execucomp observations, and 245,500 total observations (i.e., observations that contain tax or Execucomp information). 8 We match 89,500 of the 120,500 observations (a 74 percent matching rate). 9 While individuals may fall out or re-enter the Execucomp sample over time (e.g., by leaving a fi rm or dropping in their fi rm's compensation rankings), the tax data are available for every year in which the individual fi led a tax return or had certain information returns fi led on his behalf.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the company and individual data from both data sources. We defi ne executive income (based on Execucomp data) as the sum of the value of salaries, bonuses, options exercised, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), and Frydman and Jenter (2010) by replacing these two items with non-equity incentive plan compensation and the fair value of stock awards after 2005. Based on the tax data, we defi ne taxable income as adjusted gross income (AGI) reported on Form 1040 less deductions (the larger of itemized deductions or the standard deduction) and capital gains (i.e., Schedule D profi t or loss). Adjusted gross income is the difference between total income -again, as defi ned on Form 1040 -and adjustments (i.e., above-the-line deductions). Note that capital gains are often examined separately when using tax data, in part because they are only observed when realized, as opposed to when they accrue. Capital gains realizations are generally more volatile and lumpy than other income sources, and often the timing of realizations is heavily infl uenced by tax changes and the performance of the broader stock market. In most cases, these various sources of executive income are subject to taxation as ordinary income. Firms generally may deduct these expenses in the same period in which the executive is required to report them for tax purposes; however, since 1993, the deductibility of most "non-performance-based" compensation is capped at $1 million per employee.
The time at which income sources are subject to taxation varies. For example, income from salaries and bonuses is taxed in the period in which is it earned. Restricted stock grants, non-equity incentive plans, and other long-term incentive plans are also generally taxed as ordinary income, but usually not in the period that they are issued (or in which the incentive is put in place). In most cases, these income sources are taxed when they vest. 10 Vesting occurs after a set period of time or after certain performance measures are reached. Taxing at the time of vesting is similar to the treatment of salaries and bonuses, since the executive has not offi cially earned the income prior to vesting.
Traditionally, non-qualifi ed options represent the vast majority of stock options for executives (Hall and Liebman, 2000) . The value of non-qualifi ed options is generally taxable when the option is exercised, as opposed to when it is issued or vested. Because these options are generally not tradable, they are deemed to have no "readily ascertainable market value" when issued; otherwise, they would be taxed at the time of issue. The difference between the market price and the exercise price is reported as salary income on Form W-2 and is subject to income and payroll taxes. 11
III. GENERAL INCOME TRENDS AND DECOMPOSING SOURCES

A. Background on Top Incomes
In their heavily cited work, Piketty and Saez (2003) document a divergence in income shares received by those at the top of the income distribution from those in the rest of the distribution. Piketty and Saez show that top income shares fell abruptly during 10 Stock awards that are immediately vested are less common and are taxed in the period in which they are issued. 11 By contrast, qualifi ed stock options -a very small component of overall stock options -are not taxed when issued or exercised, but when the recipient sells the stock purchased via the options. At this point, the realized income is generally treated as long-term capital gains. Qualifi ed stock options are limited to a maximum of $100,000 per employee and, in contrast to non-qualifi ed options, fi rms may not deduct their value for corporate tax purposes. Bickley (2012) provides more details.
World War II and held relatively steady for the next few decades. Incomes at the very top of the distribution are consistently more volatile, experiencing sharper drops in downturns and sharper upticks during expansions. However, over longer time frames, clear patterns emerge. Beginning in the 1970s, the divergence of top incomes became a dominant phenomenon ( Figure 1 ). 12 Excluding capital gains, the share of total reported income accruing to the top 10 percent rose from 32 percent in 1973 to over 46 percent by 2010. This divergence, however, is primarily driven by the top 1 percent. Whereas the share received by the top 1 percent rose by 124 percent over this period, the share received by those in the 95 th to 99 th percentiles rose by 27 percent. Those in the 90 th to 95 th percentiles saw their share increase by only 12 percent. 13 An important caveat to the analysis by Piketty and Saez (2003) and the analysis presented later in this paper is that income shares are measured based on repeated crosssections. Repeated cross-sections focus on segments of the annual income distribution, without regard to the position of these taxpayers in previous (or subsequent) years. Put another way, this type of analysis does not follow the same people over time. The composition of individuals within an income group may vary greatly from year to year. The question of income volatility or mobility is not our focus, but is an important issue that may infl uence normative implications from this type of analysis. 14 There is no consensus as to the primary factors driving changes at the top of the income distribution. However, very-high top marginal tax rates coincided with the sharp compression during World War II. In fact, in 1942 President Roosevelt called for a 100 percent tax rate (for the top tax bracket) saying "no American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year …" (Bank, Stark, and Thorndike, 2008, p. 97) . Shortly thereafter, the top federal tax rate reached 94 percent (for income over $200,000). Top rates stayed above 90 percent until the 1960s when the top statutory rate was lowered to 70 percent. By 1988, after full enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the statutory rate for top incomes fell all the way to 28 percent. Thus, the shift towards pre-1930s income concentration loosely coincided with the lowering of top tax rates, especially since the 1980s.
A series of international studies of top incomes edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007) do not rule out taxes as playing a major rule. However, the studies do not defi nitively support such a proposition either, suggesting that if taxes are the key factor, their impact may accrue over a number of years. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) present more than a half-dozen hypotheses that attempt to explain the divergence at the top of the income distribution. One such hypothesis argues that executive compensation is a driving factor. Some evidence suggests that the rapid rise in executive compensation may be consistent with effi cient business practices (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat, 2013; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013; Mankiw, 2013) , while others argue that principal-agent problems have allowed executives to take advantage of Note: The series is based on pre-tax cash market income including realized capital gains, and always excluding government transfers. Source: Piketty and Saez, 2003, updated to 2011 shareholders by awarding themselves lavish compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009) , or that recent income divergence has been driven by economic rents (Bivens and Mishel, 2013) . These competing views are also discussed by Frydman and Saks (2010) in their examination of long-run trends in CEO compensation. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) look at the role of executives in the divergence of incomes at the top of the income distribution. They further examine trends for executives in the fi nance sector as compared to those in other sectors. Using data from 1994 and 2004, they report that average realized income for executives in the fi nance sector and nonfi nance sectors both increased by similar rates -cumulatively, an over 200 percent increase -and average income for those in the fi nance sector was about 50 percent higher than those in non-fi nancial sectors in both years. 15 The presence of both groups at the very top of the income distribution increased, but the increase was somewhat greater for executives in non-fi nancial sectors. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) further measure the contribution of other high-paid groups to the growth in top incomes. These include non-executives in the fi nance industry, as well as lawyers, professional athletes, and celebrities. They conclude that "powerful CEOs or poor corporate governance cannot possibly be more than a small part of the picture of increasing income inequality, even at the very upper end of the distribution … [although] this does not rule out the possibility that poor corporate governance affects CEO pay" (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010, p. 44) .
Many studies have used executive compensation data to examine income trends and behavioral responses to taxation, including Eissa and Giertz (2006) , Goolsbee (2000) , Liebman (1998, 2000) , and Frydman and Jenter (2010) . 16 While these studies include sources of income not reported on tax returns, they also omit important tax information. For example, several use executive compensation data to measure behavioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates. They generally fi nd that the earnings of executives are less responsive to changes in tax rates than are other high-income groups studied using tax data; however, executive compensation may be an imperfect proxy for taxable income. Several items, such as itemized deductions or income from outside the executive's fi rm, are not observed in executive compensation data. In general, capital gains realizations are also not observed. If these are important margins by which high-income taxpayers respond to tax changes, estimated elasticities based solely on executive compensation data may substantially underestimate overall behavioral responses to taxation.
In the remainder of this section, we examine recent income trends for executives, a group heavily represented at the top of the income distribution. We compare our results to trends for high-income groups more generally, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) (updated through 2011) and to trends by industry and occupation as reported by Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) , who also examine income trends using tax data through 2005; the latter study includes industry and occupation information inferred from W-2 forms and the occupation fi eld on the Form 1040. Among those at the top of the income distribution, they report different income trends for several occupations, including executives. This work also relates closely to that of Kaplan and Rauh (2010) .
B. The Changing Composition of Executive Compensation and Top Incomes
Figure 1 presents trends in mean pre-tax income shares over time and decomposed by source. This fi gure is based on public-use IRS data compiled by Piketty and Saez (2003) . Instead of presenting a fi gure for overall tax returns, we focus on the top 0.1 of 1 percent of returns. As shown later in this section, this group includes a large share of top executives -in fact more than 30 percent of our matched sample -and accounts for 80 percent of taxable income and Execucomp income in our matched sample. The long-term trend for this top income group is strongly positive, as discussed earlier for top incomes more generally. The share of income accruing to the top 0.1 percent in Figure 1 averages 6.7 percent and ranges from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 12.3 percent in 2007. With the stacked diagram, one can see the growth of each income source over this period and the relative size of the source compared to the total. For example, in 2007, when this top group's income accounted for 12.3 percent of income reported by all taxpayers, over 34 percent of this share can be attributed to capital gains (i.e., 4.8 percentage points) and 23 percent can be attributed to salaries (i.e., 3.3 percentage points).
The income share for the top 0.1 percent is extremely volatile. For example, the income share rose by over 67 percent (7.3 percent to 12.3 percent) from 2002 to 2007 and then fell by more than 32 percent (12.3 percent to 8.3 percent) from 2007 to 2009. These wide fl uctuations are driven predominantly by net capital income. 17 Capital income is both a large share of income in Figure 1 -on average, comprising an over 27 percent share for this group -and very volatile. Salaries and business income are also major income sources for this group. Combined, these two sources account for more than 43 percent of the income of this group on average. Salary income has grown roughly on par with overall income for this group. Salary income was more volatile after the recession of the early 2000s than during the Great Recession. Business income grew much more rapidly over this period than income from other major income sources. However, a substantial portion of this growth likely represents the shifting of income 17 Capital gains are closely tied to the performance of the stock market and are only reported when realized -i.e., when the taxpayer chooses to sell the asset. A presentation based on capital gains accrual would likely look very different and probably be less volatile.
from Subchapter C to Subchapter S corporations following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Slemrod, 1996; Carroll and Joulfaian, 1997; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012) . Figure 2 displays trends in the mean components of Execucomp executive income for the years 1992 to 2010. Executive compensation over these two decades is characterized by large peaks and valleys. As in Figure 1 , incomes are especially volatile in the years surrounding the last two recessions. Also, despite a 50 percent decline between 2006 and 2009, mean executive compensation increased 124 percent over the 19-year period.
Frydman and Jenter (2010) document the growth in pay for CEOs and other top executives since the 1930s. The trends we report in mean compensation from the last decade (in Figure 2 ) are consistent with their trends in median compensation from the 1990s, in which executive compensation continues a rapid growth trend that began in the mid 1970s. Our data show that from 2000 to 2002, mean executive compensation Salary income shows the least volatility and on average grows more slowly than overall compensation. As a share of overall executive compensation, salary income falls by roughly half over the last two decades -from a 35 percent share in 1992 to an 18 percent share in 2010. Salaries increase by 4.4 percent from 1992 to the 2000 peak. From 2000 to 2010, they increase another 10.3 percent.
Realized income from stock options is the major driver underlying the overall trends. Because this source is not measured when vested or issued, it likely refl ects earnings from earlier periods, as well as gains or losses driven by changes in the price of the underlying stock after vesting. Not surprisingly, the value of stock options swings wildly with the stock market. At the beginning of the period, this source represents 35 percent of total executive compensation. It peaks as a share of total executive compensation at 63 percent in 1999 and reaches a nadir, at 19 percent, in 2009. Despite rising in absolute terms by 363 percent from 1992 to 2000 and by 127 percent from 2002 to 2006, the value of stock options was up just 55.9 percent on net from 1992 to 2010. From 2000 to 2010, their value fell by 33.7 percent, on net.
The decline of stock options at the end of the last decade roughly coincides with a reporting requirement change adopted by the SEC in 2006. The changes were intended to provide a more complete and transparent picture of executives' compensation, and in particular were meant to address concerns over the backdating of options (Borges, 2012) . These changes, however, complicate the construction of a consistent measure of executive compensation across years, as several Execucomp variables were dropped or amended, while others were added, beginning in 2006. Among the changes, compensation that had been reported as long-term incentive plan compensation and restricted stock grants are now grouped in other categories. Post 2005, our defi nition of executive compensation includes non-equity incentive plan compensation and the value of (vested) stock awards in their place. 18 Non-equity incentive plan payments are primarily cash incentives tied to a fi rm's performance. Prior to 2006 they were mostly a subset of bonuses, and partly a subset of long-term incentive plan compensation. Post 2006, non-equity incentive plan compensation accounts for 76 percent of total bonuses (roughly the sum of "bonus" and non-equity incentive plan compensation) on average per year. We impute non-equity incentive plan compensation going back to 2000 using this ratio. In terms of volatility, total bonuses are closer to stock options than salaries. Mean bonuses roughly doubled from 2001 to 2006, rising from $310,000 on average to $597,000 in 2006. Early evidence suggests that the Great Recession may be merely a hiccup in this trend, as mean bonuses fell to $379,000 on average in 2008 before recovering to $555,000 on average in 2010.
Stock awards represent the value of equity awards that are not options and that vest within the year. This measure is a more relevant component of annual compensation than restricted stock grants, if one wants a measure analogous to annual taxable income. Stock awards are somewhat less volatile than bonuses or options, but are a large component of total compensation. Between 2008 and 2010 stock awards were the largest single component of mean executive compensation, with an average value of $680,000 in 2010. Average stock awards between 2006 and 2010 ($600,000) were roughly twice as large as the average restricted stock grants between 2000 and 2005 ($250,000). It is not known whether this represents a shift from options to other stock awards compensation (options declined during the Great Recession and have not recovered) or a more direct consequence of the change in disclosure rules.
C. Comparing Executives with Similarly Situated Taxpayers
Not all executives have extraordinarily high incomes. Even when looking at only the fi ve highest paid executives at publicly traded fi rms, those at the very bottom of this distribution have taxable incomes (net of capital gains) that are negative, on average. Moving to the 5 th percentile, average incomes from 2000 to 2010 were $144,000 -well within the top 5 percent of the overall income distribution, but still rather moderate. However, the vast majority of executives in the Execucomp (i.e., generally CEOs plus the next four highest paid executive at fi rms in the S&P 1500 Index) have incomes that are well above the top 1 percent of the overall income distribution. Figure 3 shows that taxable income for the 5 th percentile of our matched sample of executives is generally higher than the 95 th percentile of the overall distribution of tax fi lers. The 99 th percentile of the overall distribution falls below that of the 20 th percentile of executives ($309,000 average). 19 Figure 4 reveals that taxable income at the 99.9 th percentile (i.e., the top 0.1 of the top 1 percent) is quite similar to that for the 70 th percentile (an average of $1.5 million) of the distribution of matched executives. Income for the 99.99 th percentile of taxpayers is similar to those at the 90 th percentile ($4.4 million average) of the distribution of matched executives. Taxable income at the 95 th percentile of the matched sample ($7.8 million average) is, on average, over 60 percent larger than that at the 99.99 th percentile of the overall distribution. At the 99 th percentile (average $21.4 million) of the matched distribution, average taxable income is roughly 350 percent larger than that at the 99.99 th percentile of the overall distribution. Thus, our matched sample is, in general, not only characterized by high incomes, but by extraordinarily high incomes. That is, 30 percent of our matched sample is composed of incomes that are higher than 999 out of 1,000 taxpayers -with a sizable portion of our distribution not having a close comparison group in the work of Piketty and Saez (2003) , who do not present incomes for percentiles beyond the 99.99 th .
Figure 3 Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
Notes: Dotted lines represent taxable income at points in the distribution of the Execucomp Sample. Solid lines represent taxable income at points in the overall income distribution (as tabulated by Piketty and Saez (2003) ).
Source: Authors' calculations from IRS tax return data and tabulations from IRS data by Piketty and Saez (2003) 
D. Trends Since 2000
The fi rst decade of the 21 st century was an unusual period. The decade began with a minor recession in the aftermath of the bursting of the tech bubble. The housing and fi nancial sectors fueled economic growth through 2006, after which the economy stalled and then was hit by the fi nancial crisis and Great Recession, from which it has yet to fully recover. As a result, 2010 pre-tax incomes for most percentiles in the top 10 percent (of the overall distribution) are about the same (in real terms) as they were Year P5 Executive P10 Executive P20 Executive P30 Executive P40 Executive P95 All P99 All P99.5 All in 2000. The exception is individuals in the top half of one percent of the distribution, who experienced declines in real income. For example, incomes fell (i.e., real incomes, not income shares) by 2 percent for those at the 99.5 th percentile, by 7.4 percent for those at the 99.9 th percentile, and by 12.4 percent for those at the 99.99 th percentile. Despite declines for those at the right-tail of the distribution, trends over the past several decades suggest these top groups will more than make up for this decline as the economy strengthens.
Turning to our matched sample, Figures 3 and 4 suggest most executives experienced substantial increases in real taxable income (again excluding capital gains). In fact, from
Figure 4 Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
Source: Authors' calculations from IRS tax return data and tabulations from IRS data by Piketty and Saez (2003) the 5 th to 60 th percentiles, we fi nd income growth of between 34 and 43 percent over this period. Figure 3 suggests executives fared better over this period than did similarly situated taxpayers, who in general experienced no net income growth (as tabulated by Piketty and Saez, 2003) . 20 It is not until the 90 th percentile of our matched sample that incomes fall in real terms. Average taxable income (excluding capital gains) at the 90 th percentile of our matched sample is over $4.4 million on average, which roughly corresponds to the 99.99 th percentile of the overall distribution income distribution. In this case the pattern for executives and similarly situated taxpayers is nearly identical. Real taxable income for executives at the 90 th percentile of our matched sample fell from 2000 to 2010 by close to 11 percent, as compared to a decline of about 12.5 percent for the 99.99 th percentile for all tax returns. Moving up the distribution, the drop in taxable income for executives is much larger -and average incomes are so high that no comparable income group exists in Piketty and Saez's (2003) tabulations. At the 95 th percentile ($7.8 million average taxable income) of our matched sample, taxable income fell by close to one quarter from 2000 to 2010. At the 99 th percentile ($21.4 million average taxable income), the decline was over 28 percent.
The coeffi cient of variation normalizes these data to focus on variation (as measured by the standard deviation) as a share of mean income for each of the percentiles (Table  3) . For both the IRS and Execucomp income measures, volatility increases for higher percentiles of the income distribution. The increase in volatility is much greater for the Execucomp measure, where the coeffi cient of variation ranges from 0.09 for the 5 th percentile to 0.27 for the 99 th percentile. For taxable income, this measure ranges from 0.14 for the 5 th percentile and peaks at 0.22 for the 95 th percentile. 20 As noted in Section II, this analysis is of repeated cross-sections and thus does not follow the same cohort over time. 
E. Income Trends by Industry
Figure 5 reports trends in mean gross income for Execucomp executives in selected industries for 2000 to 2010. Industry codes are from the Execucomp data, while the gross income measure (net of capital gains) is from the tax data. Gross income is constructed in a manner analogous to Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and is composed of total income (as reported on the Form 1040) less taxable Social Security benefi ts, unemployment compensation, state tax refunds, the deduction for self-employment taxes, and longterm capital gains. Not surprisingly, incomes fl uctuate substantially with the business cycle and both levels and trends vary by industry. However, somewhat surprisingly, real mean incomes for many industries were higher in 2010 than in 2000; in fact, this is true for our matched sample overall.
One might suspect that executives in fi nance would have suffered disproportionately during the Great Recession. This certainly was the case in 2008: top executives in fi nance and insurance reported incomes that were 33 percent lower than in 2007 on average. However, by 2009, incomes for this group were above their 2007 level. In fact, Figure  5 suggests the period from 2000 to 2003 was actually worse for this group: mean gross income (at least through 2010) has not returned to its peak in 2000.
Top executives in real estate, also at the center of the fi nancial crisis, suffered bigger losses than those in fi nance. From 2000 to 2006, mean annual gross income for executives in real estate was 35 to 85 percent higher (depending on the year) than annual averages for the full matched sample. In 2009 and 2010, income for this sector was about equal to the overall mean. 21 Recall that Kaplan and Rauh (2010) compare top executives in the fi nancial and nonfi nancial sectors for the years 1994 and 2004 using Execucomp income measures, as opposed to those from tax returns. Based on the trends in Figure 5 , it appears that the pair of years chosen for this type of analysis can have a big impact on the results. For example, in two of the 11 years in our sample, gross income for executives in fi nance is just 6 percent or 7 percent above the mean for our full matched sample. However, in three of the years, executives in fi nance report incomes 69 percent to 85 percent higher than the overall average.
F. Income Growth over Selected Years
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report income growth over pairs of years for executives in a number of industries. The tables are broken down by segments of the top one percent of the overall income distribution, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) . As in Figure  5 , these tables assign executives to industries based on Execucomp data, while using income variables reported to the IRS. These tables are analogous to Tables 8 to 10 from Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) , focusing on various segments of the top 1 percent of the income distribution. Note that Bakija, Cole, and Heim focus on average growth rates for periods between 1979 and 2005 for various occupations. By contrast, we compare growth rates over pairs of years between 2000 and 2010 and compare executives in different industries. The occupation categories used by Bakija, Cole, and Heim are very broad, and in many cases are more akin to industry classifi cations. Their data end in 2005, several years before the fi nancial crisis and Great Recession. Table 4 reports growth rates by industry for executives falling between the 99 th and 99.5 th percentile -i.e., the bottom half of the top one percent -of the overall income distribution. For this part of the income distribution, growth rates vary greatly across years; however, variation across industries is fairly modest. In particular, patterns exhibited by both the fi nancial and non-fi nancial sectors (which receive much attention in Kaplan and Rauh (2010) ) are similar to those of the overall sample. For the overall matched sample, income dropped by over 9. Piketty and Saez (2003) Moving to Table 5 and those above the 99.5 th percentile but below the 99.9 th percentile, growth rates are more volatile, but the overall trend is a good approximation for most industries. Once again, the fi nancial sector appears very similar to a composite of the non-fi nancial sectors. Variation in income growth across years is amplifi ed compared to the bottom half of the top 1 percent from Table 4 . For the fi rst three sets of paired years, average income growth (or decline) is 50 percent larger than in Table 4 . Table 6 reports measures for executives with incomes above the 99.9 th percentile of the overall income distribution. While average income in 2010 was roughly the same as that in 2000 for most of the top 1 percent, incomes for the top permille -i.e., the top tenth of the top 1 percent -were 13 percent lower at the end of this period. In other respects, the patterns in the top permille are quite different from others in the Source: Authors' calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp and income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003) top 1 percent. Variation across industries and growth rates across paired years are greatly exaggerated compared to other segments of the top 1 percent. The early part of the decade was especially volatile for individuals in this group, who experienced an income drop from 2000 to 2002 that was 170 percent greater than the decline for those between the 99.5 th and 99.9 th percentiles. The post-tech bubble recovery compensated for these losses, as the highest permille's income growth was 55 percent from 2002 to 2006, or twice that of those in the next four permilles. As with the bursting of the tech bubble, the impact of the Great Recession was greater for the top permille than for the next four permilles, as average incomes for the former group dropped by 26.3 percent from 2006 to 2009, or 70 percent more than the decline in average incomes for the latter group. While all segments of the top 1 percent experienced income gains from 2009 to 2010, the top permille reported enormous gains of 19.1 percent. Source: Authors' calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp, and income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003) 
IV. CONCLUSION
The years 2000 to 2010 were a tumultuous period for top executive incomes, as was the case for the broader economy. What are now classifi ed as stock awards have grown greatly in importance over this period, and are arguably the largest source executive compensation. Stock options are the key source of volatility in executive incomes. In "good" years, these options may represent more than one-third of compensation for top executives. Despite steep drops in executive compensation in the early 2000s and during the Great Recession, executive pay for this group has more than doubled in real terms since 1992.
Not all top executives have extraordinarily high incomes. However, the vast majority are concentrated at the very top of the income distribution: 95 percent of top executives are in the top 5 percent of the income distribution and 30 percent are in the top 0.1 percent of the overall income distribution.
Executive incomes, mirroring trends in the broader income distribution, are most volatile at the right tail of the distribution. In general, trends for top executives in fi nance and non-fi nance industries were quite similar from 2000 to 2010. This is consistent with fi ndings from Kaplan and Rauh (2010) for an earlier period. Patterns for those above the 99.9 th percentile of the income distribution are quite different from other segments of the top 1 percent. In general, income swings were amplifi ed for this group and showed greater heterogeneity across industries. At this percentile, the fi nance sector was an outlier as the income decline from 2006 to 2009 in that sector was much more pronounced than that experienced by executives in non-fi nance sectors.
